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ABSTRACT
Near Field Communication (NFC) is a technology widely
used for security-critical applications like access control or
payment systems. Many of these systems rely on the secu-
rity assumption that the card has to be in close proximity
to communicate with the reader. We developed NFCGate,
an Android application capable of relaying NFC communica-
tion between card and reader using two rooted but otherwise
unmodified Android phones. This enables us to increase the
distance between card and reader, eavesdrop on, and even
modify the exchanged data. The application should work
for any system built on top of ISO 14443-3 that is not hard-
ened against relay attacks, and was successfully tested with
a popular contactless card payment system and an electronic
passport document.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Near Field Communication (NFC) technology is used for
many applications, ranging from access control and payment
systems to electronic passports. Due to the low range of the
wireless signal, many systems operate under the assumption
that successful communication between reader and token im-
plies proximity. A relay attack breaks this assumption by
placing a proxy reader near the token and an emulator near
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the reader. The reader will now communicate with the em-
ulator, which will forward all messages to the proxy reader
that will in turn communicate with the token and send back
the response. The relay attack circumvents traditional au-
thentication protocols, as the reader is still communicating
with the correct token, which will be able to correctly per-
form any authentication protocol.
Previous works have implemented this relay attack using
custom hardware [2], Nokia / Blackberry phones [1] and
customized Android systems [3]. Another implementation
[5] does not require a modified Android system, but only
works for a subset of NFC protocols, which does not include
the protocols used for many security-critical applications. It
also does not emulate the unique identifier (UID) of the card,
which is sometimes checked as part of the security model of
deployed systems.
We propose NFCGate, an NFC relay application using
a rooted stock Android phone, capable of forwarding any
NFC protocol based on ISO 14443-3 and supported by An-
droid. This allows evaluating the security of NFC systems
against many types of attacks, including relay, replay, and
modification by an active Man in the Middle (MitM).
2. METHODOLOGY
In order to implement an NFC relay on Android, two
components need to be implemented: A reader device that
communicates with the NFC token, and an emulator de-
vice, which communicates with the NFC reader (cf. Fig.
1). Android offers card reader functionality for many cards
using the android.nfc API. Starting with Android 4.4, it
also offers a Host Card Emulation (HCE) API, which allows
applications to simulate an NFC tag for an NFC reader.
However, the HCE API imposes some limitations:
• Applications need to register their Application ID (AID)
in advance and only receive traffic after the reader has
sent an ISO 14443-3 SELECT for that AID.
• The Unique Indentifier (UID) of the emulated tag is
randomized and indicates that it is an emulated tag
by setting the first byte to 0x08.
In our work, we solved both of these problems using Cydia
Substrate [4], a framework that allows applications to patch
Android code (both native C and high-level Java) without
recompiling and reflashing the system. Instead, code is in-
jected into the zygote process, from which the NFC daemon
is forked. Once it has been forked from zygote, Substrate
allows developers to hook into and change certain functions.
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Figure 1: System schematic
AID detection.
As Android only routes SELECTs for a specific AID to our
application, we modified the two functions Android uses to
detect which AID (if any) is contained within each received
NFC command. NFC SetStaticRfCback() is a part of libnfc-
nci, a native C library which Android uses to interface with
HCE-enabled NFC chips, whilst (findSelectAid()) is part of
the Android OS and written in Java.
Substrate allowed us to inject code into both of these
functions to return a wildcard AID—regardless of the in-
put value—which we could then register for our application.
As this potentially breaks other applications using HCE, we
also added an inter-process communication (IPC) compo-
nent, which allows us to dynamically enable the patch when
it is needed, and preserve the traditional behaviour for all
other times.
UID emulation.
By default, the Android HCE stack creates a random-
ized UID for each HCE session, and the API does not offer
any options to influence this behaviour. However, libnfc-nci
contains a function that allows uploading raw configuration
streams to the NFC chip. This enables us to upload con-
figuration data for all values required for the anticollision
protocol defined in ISO 14443-3, which are then used by the
chip. Using this method, we can clone the UID of a tag and
present a falsified UID to the reader, thus bypassing security
mechanisms based on the UID checks.
3. EVALUATION
We evaluated the system using a popular contactless pay-
ment system, deployed in many cafeterias, and an access
control system. These systems use MiFare DESFire EV1
chips, which offer cryptographic features for authentication
and data confidentiality. Both systems accepted our relayed
communication and successfully performed critical actions
like payments or opening doors to restricted areas by hold-
ing one device near the wallet of an authorized person. This
also worked if the communication was routed over the inter-
net. The setup also allowed us to modify data while it was
relayed, in order to drop or replace certain commands or in-
ject new commands. This functionality can be used to test
the resilience of NFC systems against manipulated data.
The basic delay of communicating with an NFC tag using
the Android APIs is around 15 ± 6 ms, depending on the
length of command and reply. Relaying the NFC commands
over the network introduces some additional delays, which
lead to a total delay of 65 ± 38 ms if the devices are in the
same wireless network, and even larger delays if the data
traverses the public internet. These delays could be reduced
by using different technologies (e.g. Bluetooth).
4. LIMITATIONS
At the moment, our application is compatible with de-
vices running Android 4.4.X. Android 5 is currently not sup-
ported, as it is incompatible with Cydia Substrate. Our ap-
plication is also affected by some limitations of the Android
system: Android does not support extended length APDUs,
so applications using this feature will not be compatible.
The UID emulation functionality does not work with ev-
ery NFC chip, but has been shown to be compatible with
the Broadcom BCM20793 family, as used in the Nexus 4, 5
and 7 (newer iteration), among other devices. Finally, some
readers are hardened against relay attacks, for example, by
using distance bounding protocols or timing checks.
5. DEMONSTRATION
For the practical demonstration, we will provide a test
setup of two Android devices and an NFC card reader. We
will provide cards for demonstration purposes, but will also
offer conference participants the chance to test their own
NFC-enabled cards or tokens. The source code of the ap-
plication and precompiled Android packages will be made
available for conference participants and the general pub-
lic. A preview version, including a video demonstration, is
available at https://seemoo.tu-darmstadt.de/nfcgate.
6. CONCLUSION
In this extended abstract, we discussed NFCGate, an NFC
relaying application for Android capable of relaying arbi-
trary NFC protocols built on ISO 14443-3. The applica-
tion successfully relayed the communication of a popular
contactless payment system based on the MiFare DESFire
technology, using two rooted Android phones. Relaying al-
lows for both inspection and modification of NFC traffic,
enabling easier, more in-depth security analysis of NFC sys-
tems without the need for specialized hardware.
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